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In the Supreme Court 
of t:he St:at:e of Ut:ah 




;TATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, and No. 6305 
[RWIN ARNOVITZ, R. E. HAMMOND, H. P. 
~EATHAM and B. H. ROBINSON, 
the members of said Commission, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding in this Court for the 
mrpose of reveiwing a decision of the State Tax Commis-
lion of Utah, dated September 11, 1940, in the proceeding 
lesignated by the said Commission as "In the Matter of the 
~edetermination of Corporation Franchise Tax of AMERI-
:AN INVESTMENT CORPORATION for the year 1937", 
md by which said decision the said Commission decided that 
here was due from plaintiff the sum of $296.3 7, with inter-
~st, as the unpaid deficiency on its corporation franchise tax 
or the calendar year 193 7. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
American Investment Corporation, plaintiff herein, is 
and was at all times since October 31, 1929, a corporation 
organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Nevada, and with its principal place of business at Ely, 
Nevada. It is, and was at all times since March 16, 1934, 
qualified to do business within the State of Utah as a foreign 
corporation. During the year 193 7 (which is the year we 
were concerned with) plaintiff was duly qualified to do busi-
ness within the State of Idaho as a foreign corporation. It is, 
and was at all times since its incorporation, primarily en-
gaged in acquiring by stock ownership the control of banking 
corporations, and holding the stqcks thereof for the purpose 
of controlling the management of the affairs of such other 
corporations. During the calendar year it owned stock in, 
and exercised control of, Idaho Bank and Trust Co., a bank-
ing corporation of the State of Idaho, and Commercial Se-
curity Bank, a banking corporation of the State of .Utah 
During the year 193 7 the said Idaho Bank and Trust Co. 
did no business within the State of Utah, nor has it ever done 
business with said state nor has it ever made or been re-
quired to make reports to the State of Utah or any depart-
ments thereof pursuant to the laws of said state or otherwise. 
Commercial Security Bank has at all times filed corporation 
franchise returns with the defendant State Tax Commission 
of Utah, including such return for the year 193 7, and has at 
all times paid all taxes due from it to the State of Utah for 
the privilege of doing business within said state. 
During the calendar year 193 7 plaintiff had the follow-
ing gross income: 
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3 
Capital gain from sale of Ohio Oil Company 
Stock ----------------------------------------------------------$ 299.40 
Capital gain from sale of Socony 
Vacuum Oil Co. Inc. Stock ------------------------ 4,424.30 
Dividends on Socony Vacuum Oil Co. Inc. 
Stock ----------------------------------------------------------
Dividend on Ohio Oil Company Stock _________ _ 
Dividends on Idaho Bank and Trust Co. Stock 
125.00 
200.00 
Stock ---------------------------------------------------------- 6,016'.60 
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Security 
Bank ------------------------------------------------------------ 112.00 
Making a total gross income of --------------------$11,177.30 
All of said income was shown on plaintiff's franchise tax re-
turn but in arriving at the amount of its taxable net income 
plaintiff deducted from said gross income the whole thereof, 
except the liquidating dividend on Commercial Security Bank 
in the sum of $112.00. Upon the subsequent audit of said 
return by the Commission, the Commission on September 11, 
1939, restored to plaintiff's net taxable income the entire 
gross income shown in plaintiff's said return and hereinabove 
set out, less only the following deductions: 
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Security 
Bank ____________ ------------------------------------------------$ 






leaving, according to the Commission, a taxable net income 
of $10,212.47, or an increase of $10,100.47 over the amount 
of taxable net income as shown by plaintiff, and assessed 
an additional tax against plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7, 
with interest from August 1, 1938, at the rate of 6% per 
:mnum. 
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Within the time allowed by law, on November 3, 1939, 
plaintiff duly filed its petition with the said Commission for 
a redetermination of said deficiency. Upon the hearing be-
for the Commission on said petition, the following facts were 
established: 
That during the period in question, plaintiff was a for-
eign corporation, with its principal place of business at Ely, 
Nevada; that it was qualified to do and doing business 
within the State of Utah; that its primary business was in 
holding the stock of banking corporations for the purpose 
of controlling the management of the affairs thereof; that 
it did hold stock in and control the affairs of Idaho Bank 
and Trust Co., an Idaho corporation, doing no business with-
in the State of Utah, and Commercial Security Bank, a Utah 
corporation; that it also owned stock in Socony Vacuum Oil 
Company, a corporation of the State of New York, with its 
principal place of business at New York City, and Ohio Oil 
Company, a corporation of the State of Ohio, with is principal 
place of business at Findlay, Ohio, which said two companies 
plaintiff did not control; that of its gross income during the 
calendar year 1937, $299.40 was a capital gain from the sale 
of Ohio Oil Company stock, $4,424.30 was a capital gain 
from the sale of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company stock, $200.00 
was a dividend on the Ohio Oil Company stock, $125.00 was 
a dividend on the Socony Vacuum Oil Company stock, $6,-
016.60 was a dividend on Idaho Bank and Trust Company 
stock, and $112.00 was a liquidating dividend on Commercial 
Security Bank stock. 
Under date of September 11, 1940, the Commission 
rendered its decision in writing upon plaintiff's said petition 
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for redetermination of said deficiency, giving plaintiff notice 
of said decision on September 19, 1940. By said decision 
the Commission decided that the whole of plaintiff's gross 
income, less only the following deductions: 
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Se-
curity Bank ------------------------------------------------$ 
Federal Tax paid to the United States 





constituted plaintiff's taxable net income, and assessed a de-
ficiency tax against plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7, with in-
terest at 6 per cent per annum from August 1, 1938, to the 
date of the decision, and 1 per cent per month from that date 
until paid. 
Thereafter and within the time allowed by law, plaintiff, 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 7, Chapter 13, Title 
80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, petitioned this Court 
to review the said decision of the Commission. Under the 
provisions of the Franchise Tax Act (Chapter 13, Title 80, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), this Court by Certiorari 
may review the decision of the Commission on both the law 
and the facts. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the decision of 
the Commission whereby it assessed a deficiency tax against 
plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7, with interest, is without and 
in excess of its powers, and unlawful, for the following 
~easons: 
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(a) That said deficiency was assessed against plaintiff 
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and plaintiff is exempt from the pro-
visions thereof by virtue of Section 5 ( 16) of said Chapter 
and Title. 
(b) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion 
by the Commission in plaintiff's net taxable income of the 
sum of $6.016.60, which sum was received by plaintiff dur-
ing 193 7 as dividends on stock owned by it in said Idaho 
Bank and Trust Company and was not derived from business 
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is such income 
assignable to business done by plaintiff within the State of 
Utah. 
(c) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion 
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $4,424.30, 
which sum was received by plaintiff as a gain to it from the 
sale of stock of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and was not 
derived by plaintiff from business done by it within the State 
of Utah, nor is it assignable to business done within the State 
of Utah. 
(d) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion 
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $125.00, which 
amount was received by plaintiff as dividends paid to it on 
stock of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and was not derived 
by plaintiff from business done by it within the State of Utah, 
nor is it assignable to business done by plaintiff within the 
State of Utah. 
(e) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion 
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $299.40, which 
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amount was received by plaintiff as a gain upon the sale of 
stock of Ohio Oil Company and was not derived from business 
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is it assignable 
to business done by plaintiff within the State of Utah. 
(f) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion 
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $200.00, which 
sum was received by plaintiff as dividends on stock of Ohio 
Oil Company and was not derived from business done by 
plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is it assignable to busi-
ness done by plaintiff within the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
As shown by the foregoing statement of errors it is the 
contention of plaintiff, first, that it is specifically exempt 
from the provisions of the Corporation Franchise Tax Act 
(Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), and, 
accordingly, no deficiency could be assessed against it pursu-
ant to said Act; and, second, that if it is not so exempt and 
said Act applies to plaintiff, nevertheless the said deficiency 
assessment is erroneous for the reason that it is based upon the 
inclusion in plaintiff's taxable net income of items of gross 
income which do not, under the provisions of said Act, con-
situate taxable net income. These points will be argued 
seriatim. 
Section 80-13-5, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, exempts 
certain corporations from the provisions of said Franchise 
Tax Act. Subsection 16 of said section provides as follows: 
"Corporations whose sole business consists of hold-
ing the stock of other corporations for the purpose of 
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controlling the management of affairs of such other 
corporations, if such other corporations make returns 
under this Chapter." 
In other words, corporations of the type referred to in said 
sub-section 16 are exempt from the provisions of the Fran-
chise Tax Act. 
Heretofore, however, the Commission has held that 
plaintiff did not come within the provisions of said exempting 
sub-section for two reasons; first, because during the period 
in question, plaintiff's sole business did not consist of hold-
ing the stock of Idaho Bank and Trust Company and Com-
mercial Security Bank for the purpose of controlling the 
management of the affairs of such corporations, and, second, 
the plaintiff was authorized by its Articles of Incorporation 
to do more than simply hold the stock of other corporations 
for the purpose of controlling the management of the affairs 
of the same. This position of the Commission, however, is 
in direct conflict with the holding of this court in the case 
of First Security Corporation of Ogden vs. State Tax Com-
mission, 91 Utah 101, 63 Pac. (2) 1062, wherein no import-
ance was attached by this Court to the faCt that the corpora-
tion claiming exemption under the sub-section was in fact 
authorized by its Articles of Incorporation to do more, and 
in fact did more, than hold stock in other corporations for the 
purpose of controlling the management thereof. 
In that case this court had before it for determination the 
question of whether the First Security Corporation was ex-
empt from the provisions of said Act by virtue of said subsec-
tion 16. This court held the First Security Corporation to 
be such a corporation as was referred to by said subsection, 
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and, accordingly, exempt from the provisions of the Act. 
Plaintiff submits that it is the same type of corporation as 
the facts in the First Security Corporation case disclosed the 
First Security Corporation to be, and that its operations are 
substantially similar, and that as this court held the First Se-
curity Corporation exempt from the Act, so must plaintiff 
likewise be held to be exempt. 
The facts in the First Security Corporation case were 
stipulated. It appeared that the First Security Corporation, 
(like plaintiff), was a foreign corporation organized primar-
ily (not solely) for the purpose of acquiring by stock owner-
ship the control of banking and other corporations, and that 
it was qualified as a foreign corporation to do business in the 
State of Utah. It bought, held and sold stocks of a corpora-
tion other than one of its subsidiaries, namely, Amalgamated 
Sugar Company. (This was similar to the action of plaint 
-iff in buying, holding and selling stocks in Ohio Oil Com-
pany and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company). Like plaintiff, it 
held stock holders' meetings in Utah at which reports were 
presented and directors elected, and held Directors' meetings 
in Utah, at which matters connected with the control and 
management of the affairs of its subsidiaries were considered. 
And, finally, it was shown that by its charter it, like plaintiff, 
had very broad powers, and was not limited to holding stock 
in other corporations for the purpose of controlling the same. 
This Court, upon those facts, held the First Security Corpora-
tion exempt from the provisions of the Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Act. By the same token, we submit, plaintiff like.:' 
wise should be held exempt. 
The Commission, however, will undoubtedly argue, as 
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it has heretofore, that this court, in exempting the First Se-
curity Corporation, did not consider the fact that by its 
charter it had broad powers, and that it was not a corpora-
tion whose sole business consisted in holding stock in other 
corporations for the purpose of controlling the same. In other 
words, the Commission will undoubtedly argue that if the 
Court had properly considered all the facts presented to it 
which bore upon the question presented to the Court, this 
court would not, in that event, have held the First Security 
Corporation exempt. We submit that such argument, if made, 
is nothing but gratuitous insult to the Court. The facts pre-
sented to the Court showed the broad powers of the First 
Security Corporation, and that it in fact was not a corporation 
whose sole business consisted in managing, by stock owner-
ship, the affairs of other corporations. The question present-
ed was whether, under all the facts, the corporation came 
within the exempting subsection. To now suggest that this 
Court deliberately ignored certain facts bearing upon the 
question to be decided, to which facts the attention of the 
Court had been expressly directed, is but to suggest a laxity 
upon the part of the Court which is unwarranted. 
However, if it should be determined that this plaintiff 
is not exempt from the provisions of the Act, as was the First 
Security Corporation, despite the fact that the facts with res-
pect to it are substantially identical with the facts relating 
to plaintiff, nevertheless, plaintiff submits the assessment is 
erroneous for the reason that it is based upon the inclusion 
in plaintiff's next taxable income of gross income which can-
not under the provisions of the Act, be considered as taxable 
net income, namely, income derived by plaintiff from business 
not done by it within the State of Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, en-
titled "Rules for Determining Net Income Allocated to this 
State" provides as follows: 
"The portion of net income assignable to business 
done within this State, and which shall be the basis and 
measure of the tax imposed by this Chapter, may be de-
termined by an allocation upon the basis of the following 
rules: 
( 1) Rents, interest and dividends derived from 
business done outside this state less related expenses 
shall not be allocated to this state. 
( 2) Gains from the sale or exchange of capital 
assets consisting of real or tangible personal property 
situated outside this state less losses from the sale or ex-
change of such assets situated outside this state shall not 
be allocated to this state. 
( 3) Rents, interest and dividends derived from 
business done in this state less related expenses shall 
be allocated to this state. 
( 4) Gains from the sale or exchange of capital 
assets consisting of real or tangible personal property 
situated within this state less losses from the sale or ex-
change of such assets situated in this state shall be al-
located to this state. 
( 5) If the bank or other corporation carries on no 
business outside this state, the whole of the remainder 
of net income may be allocated to this state. 
( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries on 
any business outside this state, the said remainder may 
be divided into three equal parts: 
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be attributed 
to business carried on within this state as shall be found 
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by multiplying said third by a fraction whose numerator 
is the value of the corporation's tangible property sit-
uated within this state and whose denominator is the 
value of all the corporation's tangible property where-
ever situated. 
(b) Of another third, such portion shall be at-
tributed to business carried on within this state as shall 
be found by multiplying said third by a fraction whose 
numerator is the total amount expended by the corpora-
tion for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensa-
tion to its employees and assignable to this state and 
whose denominator is the total expenditure of the cor-
poration for wages, salaries, commissions or other com-
pensation to all of its employees. 
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion shall be 
attributed to business carried on within this state as shall 
be found by multiplying said third by a fraction whose 
numerator is the amount of the corporation's gross re-
ceipts from business assignable to this state and whose 
denominator is the amount of the corporation's gross re-
ceipts from all its business. 
(d) The amount assignable to this state of ex~ 
penditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, com-
missions or other compensation to its employees shall 
be such expenditures for the taxable year as represents 
the compensation of employees not chiefly situated at, 
connected with or sent out from, premises for the trans· 
action of business owned or rented by the corporation 
outside this state. 
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross re· 
ceipts from business assignable to this state shall be the 
amount of its gross receipts for the taxable year from 
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or ef-
fected in behalf of the corporation by agents or a· 
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gencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent 
out from premises for the transaction of business 
owned or rented by the corporation outside this 
state, and sales otherwise determined by the tax 
commission to be attributable to the business con-
ducted on such premises, 
(2nd) Rentals or royalties from property sit-
uated, or from the use of patents, within this state. 
(f) The value of the corporation's tangible prop-
erty for the purpose of this section shall be the average 
value of such property during the taxable year. 
( 7) In the allocation of net income, gain or loss 
shall be recognized and shall be computed on the same 
basis and in the same manner as is provided in this chap-
ter for the determination of net income. 
( 8) If in the judgment of the tax commission the 
application of the foregoing rules does not allocate to 
this state the proportion of net income fairly and equit-
ably attributable to this state, it may with such inform-
ation as it may be able to obtain make such allociation 
as is fairly calculated to assign to this state the portion 
of net income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the tax-
payer to double taxation." 
As heretofore pointed out, plaintiff, during the period in 
question, received income by way of dividends on stock owned 
by it in Idaho Bank and Trust Company in the sum of $6,-
016.60, in Ohio Oil Company in the sum of $200.00, and in 
Socony Vacuum Oil Company in the sum of $125.00. Like-
wise it had gains from the sale of stock in Ohio Oil Company 
in the sum of $299.40, and from the sale of stock in Socony 
Vacuum Oil Company in the sum of $4,424.30. As there is 
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no suggestion by the Commission that application of subsec-
tions ( 1), ( 2), ( 3) and ( 4) above quoted would not allocate 
to this state the proportion of net income fairly and equitably 
attributable thereto (referring to subsection ( 8)), allocation 
of plaintiff's net income should be made pursuant to said 
subsections ( 1), (2), ( 3) and ( 4). Plaintiff submits that 
such dividends and such gains are within the provisions of 
the subsections, and are not, therefore, allocable to income as-
signable to business done within the State. In this regard 
we will first consider the dividends. 
It will be noted that the language of the statute is that 
"dividends derived by business done outside this state less 
related expenses shall not be allocated to this state". The 
question to be determined, accordingly, is whether dividends 
received by plaintiff on its several stocks were derived by it 
from "business done outside this state" or from "business 
done in this state". In considering this question an important 
factor must be borne in mind. It is that plaintiff was a non-
resident of the State of Utah, and was doing business in Utah 
solely by virtue of its compliance with the laws of Utah rel-
ative to foreign corporations desiring to do business therein. 
The state of its domicile was the state of its incorporation, 
namely, Nevada. The fact that it was doing business in states 
other than that of Nevada (and it is not denied that it was 
doing business in other states, including Utah) does not alter 
the fact that it was domiciled in Nevada, and a non-resident 
insofar as states other than Nevada are concerned. Booth v. 
Weigand, 28 Utah 372, 79 Pac. 570; Wilso,n v. Triumph Cons. 
Min. Co. 19 Utah 66; 56 Pac. 300. This is not a case of a 
state endeavoring to tax the entire income of one of its citi-
zens from whatever source it may be derived. Such, we con-
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cede, might be done if the taxing statute so provided. But 
here the state of Utah is endeavoring to base a tax upon and 
measure the same by the income of one who is not one of its 
citizens. In so doing it is limited to a consideration of income 
derived solely from business done within its borders, as it 
cannot use as the basis of the tax income from business done 
without the state. California Packing Corporatio,n v. State 
Tax Commission, 97 Utah 367, 93 Pac. (2) 463. It is import-
ant, accordingly, to determine whether the receipt of dividends 
by plaintiff on stock of corporations which did no business 
within the state of Utah constitutes income derived by 
plaintiff from business done by it within such state. 
The Supreme Court of the United States early adopted 
the rule that the situs of intangibles for taxation purposes is 
the domicile of the owner. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 
1, 48 S. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. 749; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. 
S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056. Subsequently such 
court modified such rule somewhat in the case of Wheeling 
Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L. 
Ed. 1143, by holding that intangibles can acquire a business 
situs apart from the residence of the owner so as to be there 
taxable. Still more recent decisions have tended back to the 
original domicile theory of taxation of intangibles. Newark 
Fire Ins. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 59 S. Ct. 918, 83 L. Ed. 
1312, 307 U. S. 313; Curry v. McCanless, 59 S. Ct. 900; 
83 L. Ed. 1339, 307 U.S. 357. And so if this case involved the 
question of the power of the state to tax the intangibles them-
selves it might become necessary for this court to decide 
which theory it would follow. But that question is not here 
involved, nor is it necessary for this court to determine 
whether the stocks themselves acquired such a situs within 
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the State of Utah as to permit such state to tax them. We 
are here concerned with quite a different matter, namely, the 
question of the income (dividends) received from the stock, 
as distinguished from the stock itself. This question cannot 
be answered simply by a determination of the situs of the 
stock itself for the purpose of taxation, but depends upon en-
tirely different considerations. In this connection we do not 
desire to be taken as conceding that the stock itself had ac-
quired a situs in Utah sufficient to justify a tax thereon. The 
record is entirely devoid of any showing relative thereto other 
than that the stock was kept in Utah as a matter of conveni-
ence to the owner, and even those courts which have per-
mitted the taxation of intangibles in states other than that of 
the domicile of the owner on the theory that such intangibles 
have acquired a "business situs" separate and apart from that 
of the owner, require definite evidence that the intangibles 
were integral parts of the business conducted. As pointed 
out by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Newark Fire Ins. v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra, 
"To overcome the presumption of domiciliary loca-
tion, the proof of business situs must definitely connect 
the intangibles as an integral part of the local activity. 
The facts presented by this record fall far short of this 
requirement.'' 
And by the same court in the case of New York ex rel. Cohn 
v. Graves, 81 L. Ed. 666, 300 U. S. 308, wherein it was con-
tended by the resident tax payer that certain bonds (which 
were physically located outside the taxing state) had attained 
a "business situs" separate and apart from that of his resi-
dence: 
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"Appellant also argues that the interest from the 
bonds is immune from taxation by New York because 
they have acquired a business situs in New Jersey with-
in the doctrine of New Orleans v. Stempel, * * * *. This 
contention, if pertinent to the present case, is not sup-
ported by the record. The stipulation of facts discloses 
only that the bonds and mortgages were located in New 
Jersey. * * * * The burden rested upon the tax payer 
to present further facts which would establish a "busi-
ness situs"." 
Similarly interesting is the discussion of the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma on this point in the case of Chestnut Se-
curities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al., 48 Pac. (2) 
817. Chestnut Securities Corporation was a Delaware Corp-
oration, having been granted its charter December 14, 1931. 
On December 28, 1931, it was licensed to do business in Ok-
lahoma. All of its stockholders and directors lived in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; all of its business was transacted from its Tulsa 
office; all of its directors meetings were held in Tulsa; all of 
its properties were controlled from T~lsa (although certain 
of its intangibles were physically absent from Oklahoma) ; 
and it was also shown that the Company did no business any-
where except in Oklahoma. In considering the question as 
to whether the intangibles which were physically absent from 
Oklahoma had acquired a business situs there, the Court said: 
"The corporation is a legal entity separate and dis-
tinct from the directors and officers. The residence of 
the latter cannot affect the domicile of the former, and 
we do not consider the residence of the directors a de-
termining factor herein. Control of the intangible prop-
erty is a factor to be considered, but such control 
must be so evercised that the intangible property 
is actually used or employed by the non-resident corpor-
ation in its business transacted in this state. There is 
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evidence that these stocks, bonds, etc., were never used 
in the business of plaintiff transacted in this state. It 
is true that the evidence also discloses that the plaintiff 
did not transact business at any other place, but it is not 
inconceivable that at the time the plaintiff received its 
charter from the state of Delaware, or at least before 
it was licensed to do business in this state, it invested a 
part of its capital stock in the intangible properties which 
are sought to be taxed here and held them thereafter as 
an investment. There is no evidence that plaintiff pur-
chased and held these properties in foreign states for the 
purpose of evading the tax laws of this state, and we can-
not presume that it did so." 
In the present case, plaintiff contends the evidence failed 
to disclose that the stock had acquired a business situs in 
Utah. If such was the case the only situs it had was a domji-
ciliary situs in the state of Nevada. As neither the stock itself, 
nor the enterprise represented by the stock, had a situs in the 
state of Utah, under the decision of this court in the case of 
California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 
supra, the income therefrom was not taxable. However, if 
we care to assume that the stock itself did have a business 
situs within the state of Utah, nevertheless the income there-
from is not taxable by Utah, nor can it be used as a basis for a 
determination of the tax under the Franchise Tax Act, for the 
reason that the income on the stock (dividends), as dis-
tinguished from the stock itself, was not derived from business 
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah. The act says that 
"dividends derived from business done outside this state * * 
* * shall not be allocated to this state". The dividends which 
this plaintiff received from Idaho Bank and Trust Company 
were from business done by that company in Idaho. No busi-
ness, which resulted in the payment of dividends by that com-
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pany to plaintiff, was done in Utah. The dividends were 
earned in Idaho, and payment thereof made in Idaho. The 
fact that they were received by plaintiff in Utah cannot be 
construed as meaning that they were received from business 
done in Utah. Plaintiff might have requested that the checks 
be mailed to it in any other state, and such a request and sub-
sequent compliance therewith by the bank, could not consti-
tute doing business in the state to which the checks were 
mailed. 
It seems to us that an analysis of the statute can result 
in no other conclusion than that to which we have arrived, 
namely, that the receipt of dividends in the State of Utah 
on stock physically held therein by a non-resident, which 
stock. is in a corporation foreign to the State of Utah and 
which does no business within the State of Utah, does not 
constitute income derived from business done in the State of 
Utah, and that authority to support such conclusion should 
be unnecessary. It may be lack of necessity for such author-
ity accounts for the dearth thereof, as plaintiff has been un-
able to fnnd but a single case directly in point. Such case is 
Stanley Works v. Hackett, Tax Commissioner, 190 Atl. 743 
(Conn.). Stanley Works was a Connecticut corporation, and 
it, in the year 193 5, in addition to other business done by it, 
held stock in three Canadian corporations, being the sole 
owner of all of the stock of such corporations. Such corpora-
tions were, however, under the active management of man-
agers resident in Canada, and did no business whatever out-
side the Dominion of Canada. Stanley Works received the 
sum of $720,97 5 in dividends on its stock holding in such cor-
porations, showing the same in its return to the state of Con-
necticut, but not including the same in its computation of the 
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amount of the franchise tax due the state of Connecticut. The 
tax commissioner overruled the Company's claim that such 
amount should not be included in the computation of the tax 
and imposed an additional tax of $14,168,99 on account of 
this item. We quote the following from the opinion of the 
Oklahoma court in that case: 
"We are not here concerned with the bare question 
whether in measuring a tax imposed upon a corporation 
for the privilege of doing busines sin a state dividends re-
ceived upon the stock of other corporations may be in-
cluded with income it receives from other sources. See 
McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228, U. S. 295, 
308, 33 S. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. The question before 
us is whether, in working out the scheme of the statute 
for the allocation of income within and without the state, 
dividends upon the stock of the Canadian corporations 
fall within one class or the other. The specific provision 
of the statute determinative of the present case is as fol-
lows: 'Interest,dividends, royalties and gains from sales 
of intangible assets, less related expenses, when received 
by a company having its principal place of business with-
in the state, shall be allocated to the state and, when re-
ceived by a company having its principal place of busi-
ness without the state, shall be allocated without the 
state; provided, when it can be clearly established that 
such income is received in connection with business with-
in the state, such income shall be allocated to the state 
without regard to the location of the principal place of 
business of the taxpayer, and a similar rule shall apply 
to such income received in connection with business with-
out the state.' Section 420c( 1). 
The method of allocation provided is applied to net 
income. As under the provision concerning deductions 
dividends upon the stock of domestic corporations are in 
in general to be deducted in the determination of the net 
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income, it follows that the word 'dividends' as used in 
the quotation above can only refer to dividends upon the 
stock of the small class of corporations of this country 
which do not pay a federal income tax or dividends re-
ceived upon stock of foreign corporations. The state 
contends that the phrase 'in connection with business 
within the state' and the corresponding phrase with ref-
erence to 'business without the state' refer only to the 
business done by the corporation itself within or without 
the state, that the business done by the Canadian corpor-
ations cannot properly be regarded as business done by 
the plaintiff and that therefore the provision is not ap-
plicable. While for many purposes the law might not 
regard the plaintiff as doing business in Canada by 
reason of the ownership of all the stock in the Canadian 
corporations, in our approach to tax legislation we may 
properly view it from the standpoint of substance, and 
not of form (Cardozo, ]., People ex rei. Alpha 
Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 57, 129 
N. E. 202); and, if we. do, we cannot avoid the conclu-
sion that the plaintiff 'made use of the activities of these 
subsidiary corporations as essential parts of its business' 
(National Leather Co. v. Commonwealth, 256 Mass. 
419, 423, 152 N. E. 916, 917); and that it 'did, in a very 
real and practical sense, employ these stocks as an in-
strumentality in carrying on its business' (National 
Leather Co. v. Massachusetts, 277 U. S. 413, 423, 48 S 
Ct. 534, 535, 536, 72 L. Ed. 935); so that the business 
of the Canadian corporations might be regarded as its 
business. 1\tloreover, the contention of the state would 
necessarily exclude all 'dividends' received by the plaint-
iff from the operation of the provision in question, be-
cause they would only represent ownership of stock of 
corporations other than the plaintiff. This would re 
quire that the words 'such income' be related to the 
other three items mentioned at the beginning of the pro-
vision to the exclusion of 'dividends'; and such gram-
matical construction has no warrant in the terms of the 
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statute. In fact, the use of the broad words 'in connec-
tion with business' has significance, for had the narrower 
construction contended for by the state been intended, 
it would have been natural for the Legislature to use a 
phrase with a more restricted meaning. The intent of 
the statute as regards 'dividends' within the scope of 
this provision evidently was a substitute for the compli-
cated provisions of the federal act designed to afford 
protection against double taxation as regards dividends 
not deductible in determining net income, a simpler pro-
vision applicable alike to them and to the other types of 
income delt with in this portion of the law. As in this 
case the dividends in question were all earned upon busi-
ness done in the Dominion of Canada, they should be 
allocated without the state." 
While, as heretofore pointed out, we have been unable 
to find but the single case wherein the courts have found it 
necessary to advise the taxing authorities of a state that they 
cannot tax the income of a foreign corporation received as 
dividends upon stock owned by it in a second foreign corpora-
tion, the courts have, on numerous occasions, held that the 
owning or holding of stocks in domestic corporations does not 
constitute "doing" or "transacting" business within the states 
of the domestic corporations domicile, even though the stock 
ownership is sufficient to control the domestic corporations, 
and that the purchase of stock does not constitute doing or 
transacting business. Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft. Myers, 
188 So. 853 (Fla); State ex rel City of St. Louis v. Public 
Service Commission of Missouri, 73 S. W. (2) ·393; United 
States Rubber Company v. Query, 19 F. Supp. 191; Manning-
ton v. Hocking Valley Ry Co., 183 Fed. 133; State v. Humble 
Oil & Refining Co., 263 S. W. 319 (Tex.). In other words 
even though Idaho Bank and Trust Company had been a 
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Utah corporation, the income received by plaintiff as divi-
dends on stock held therein would not be taxable in Utah 
under the present Utah statute, because, the statute bases 
the tax only on income received from "business done in this 
state", and the holding of stock does not constitute "doing 
business". Since the holding of stock by plaintiff in a Utah 
corporation would not constitute the doing of business by 
plaintiff in Utah, the receipt of dividends on such stock hold-
ings could not be construed as income from business done in 
this state. Thus considered it is inconceivable upon what 
theory the holding of stock by plaintiff in a foreign corpora-
tion could be construed as the doing of business by plaintiff in 
Utah, so as to constitute dividends received by it on such 
stock holdings as income received from "business done in 
this state". 
We have so far limited our discussion to a consideration 
of the dividends received by plaintiff upon stock held by 
it in Idaho Bank and Trust Company, but what has been said 
as to those dividends applies with even greater force to the 
dividends received upon stock held in Socony Vacuum Oil 
Company and Ohio Oil Company, as plaintiff was but another 
stockholder insofar as those companies were concerned, while 
it was the principal stockholder of Idaho Bank and Trust 
Company. Holding or owning stock by a foreign corporation 
in another corporation does not constitute "doing business" 
in a state other than that of the foreign corporation's domicile, 
(cases cited supra), and, accordingly, dividends received by 
plaintiff on stock owned by it in other corporations are not 
dividends from "business done in this state". 
Consideration of plaintiff's gains from the sale of stock 
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of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and Ohio Oil Company re-
quires a somewhat different approach than that involved in 
the consideration of the dividends received by plaintiff. As 
a premise to this portion of our argument, we submit the 
proposition that if the gain is to be allocated to Utah for the 
purpose of determining the amount of plaintiff's franchise 
tax the same must be allocated pursuant to Section 80-13-21, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, heretofore set out in full 
herein. In other words, since we are dealing with the prob-
lem of determining the amount plaintiff owes the State of 
Utah for the privilege of doing business therein for a certain 
year, and since the legislature has seen fit to provide certain 
rules for the determination thereof, such determination must 
be in accord with such rules as so fixed by the legislature. We 
do not suggest that the legislature could not have fixed other 
rules, or more inclusive rules, but that the rules fixed by the 
legislature, whatever they may be, are exclusive of any other 
method of determination. 
It will be noted that included in the rules for determin-
ing net income allocated to this state as fixed by the legisla-
ture are two rules and no others dealing with gains from the 
sales or exchange of capital assets, which rules are set out in 
subsections (2) and (4) of Section 80-13-21. (We are, in 
this connection, excluding consideration of subsection ( 8), 
because the Tax Commission has never intimated that such 
subsection had any application here.) Subsection ( 2) pro-
vides that "gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets 
consisting of real or tangible property situate outside this state 
* * * shall not be allocated to this state," while subsection 
( 4) provides that "gains from the sale or exchange of capital 
assets consisting of real or tangible property situated within 
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this stat * * * shall be allocated to this state". (italics sup-
plied) Those two subsections deal exclusively with real or 
tangible property, and do not purport to refer in any wise to 
intangible property. The legislature has, therefore, failed to 
provide for allocation of gains from the sale or exchange of 
intangible property, and, having so failed, the Commission 
has no authority to make any allocation whatever of the gains 
from the sale or exchange of intangible property, and a con-
sideration thereof has no place in the determination of plaint-
iff's franchise tax. As shares of stock in corporations are in 
tangible property - Gallatin County Farmers' Alliance Vt 
Flannery, 197 Pac. 996, and cases therein cited - it follows 
that plaintiff's gain from the sale of its stock holdings 
in Socony Vacuum Oil Company and Ohio Oil Company con-
stituted gains from the sale of intangible property, and the 
Tax Commission was without authority to allocate the same. 
Again we desire to point out that we are not urging that the 
legislature could not have provided for allocation of gains 
from the sale of intangibles, the same as it provided for al-
location of dividends received therefrom, but it has not so 
provided and the Commission is bound by what the legisla-
ture has done in this regard, and not by what it could have 
done. 
It is not, however, necessary fo rplaintiff to rest upon 
the failure of the legislature to allocate these gains, because, 
had subsection ( 2) and ( 4) included gains from the sale or 
exchange of intangibles as well as tangibles, the gains receiv-
ed from the sale by plaintiff from the sale of these stocks 
would have been allocated outside the state under subsection 
( 2), for the reason that they are gains from the sale of prop-
erty situate outside the state of Utah. This because, as they 
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are intangibles, the presumption is that their situs is the domi-
cile of plaintiff, namely, Nevada, and there is no sufficient 
showing that they had attained a business situs in Utah sep-
arate and apart from their domicilary situs. 
CONCLUSION . 
Y+(lr~~~~LAL ;;( ~ ~ :rt"~eee~~af, re~t YpeB ~ 
that the decision of the Tax Commission in assessing a de-
ficiency tax against plaintiff for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in Utah during the year 1935, is erroneous, first, because 
it was assessed pursuant to Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and such Chapter has, by virtue of 
Section 80-13-5 (16) no application to plaintiff, second, be-
cause it is based upon the inclusion in plaintiff's net taxable 
income of dividends received by plaintiff on stock owned by 
it, which dividends were not derived from business done in 
this state, and, accordingly, were not allocable to Utah, and, 
third, because it is based upon the inclusion in plaintiff's net 
taxable income of gains to plaintiff from the sale of intangible 
property, and gain from the sale of intangibles are not, under 
the provisions of 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
allocable to U tab. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DeVINE, HOWELL & STINE and 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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